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Abstract 
This paper surveys the different uses to which history has been put, and the different 
historiographical perspectives adopted, in psychical research and related enterprises since 
the mid-nineteenth century. It contrasts recent historiographies of the science with those 
employed from late eighteenth century to the 1960s, and shows how these and other 
developments in the practice of history have dramatically changed our understanding of the 
places occupied by psychical research and the ‘occult’ in ‘orthodox’ sciences and wider 
culture. The second half of this paper outlines some of the key ways in which we can 
proceed still further in the shift towards better situating psychical research in its 
contemporary scientific contexts and abandoning rigid and ultimately unhelpful 
distinctions between ‘science’ and ‘pseudo-science’. I suggest that by deepening our 
understanding of nineteenth and early twentieth century scientific cultures — their troubles 
as well as successes — we can better appreciate why psychic phenomena were considered 
fit topics of scientific research. In conclusion I consider the suggestion that eclecticism is a 
virtue and necessity in history and suggest that it’s precisely because my discipline, the 
history of science, is more eclectic than many that it is and will continue to be a fruitful 
resource for developing our histories of psychical research. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Addressing the Society for Psychical Research in 1913, the French philosopher Henri 
Bergson argued that the phenomena with which the society occupied itself were 
“undeniably of the same kind as those which form the subject-matter of natural science” 
insofar as they promised to be shown to be “subject to laws” and “capable of being 
repeated indefinitely in time and space” (Bergson, 1913, p. 159). And yet the methods 
that the SPR was “obliged to follow” had “often no relation with that of any of the 
sciences of nature”. The SPR’s approach was: 
one which stands midway between that of the historian and that of the magistrate. Did 
the veridical hallucination take place in the past? — You study documents, you criticise 
them, you write a page of history. Is it a fact of to-day? — You proceed to a kind of 
judicial enquiry; you examine the witnesses, confront them with one another, and weigh 
the value of their evidence. 
To a certain extent Bergson’s views were justified. The SPR’s most important 
publications to date, including Gurney, Myers and Podmore (1886), Barrett (1897), and 
the numerous volumes of the Proceedings and Journal, amply testified to the society’s 
preoccupation with the authentication and interpretation of historical documents bearing 
on the truth or otherwise of psychic phenomena. But many early psychical researchers 
agreed with the SPR’s first president Henry Sidgwick that they needed ideally to possess 
observational acumen of an experimental scientist as well as historical and judicial 
expertise. Only such a multi-talented individual would be able to deal with the three main 
sources of error that Sidgwick judged to be present in psychical research: “(1) alteration 
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of a narrative or tradition, when it is not obtained at first hand; (2) errors in memory, 
when the narrative is told after a lapse of time; (3) errors in the actual apprehension of the 
fact, partly through failure to observe material circumstances, partly through the mingling 
of inference with observation” (Sidgwick, 1889, p. 4). 
Sidgwick’s plea for a critical approach to sources owed much to the methods of 
German historical scholarship practised by his Cambridge colleagues including Lord 
Acton. It has been tempting to regard the decade after the formation of the SPR as one 
witnessing the displacement of an older, literary and ‘amateur’ history with a new, 
‘scientific’ and ‘professional’ history, but as Collini (1991) has shown it witnessed the 
continuation of a range of different types of history, from the ‘literary’ to the ‘scientific’. 
The need to speak of histories (plural) rather than history (singular) is even more 
warranted today. Since Acton’s day the map of history has become even more complex 
and much more difficult to characterise as a homogeneous discipline. From the 1950s 
‘history’ began fragmenting into numerous chronological sub-disciplines, and thematic 
groupings, as well as histories informed by particular ideologies, and those distinguished 
by specific methods (Black & MacRaild, 2000). Alongside this, technological 
developments such as television, electronic cataloguing, and the internet have caused a 
rapid growth in the number of ways in which histories are researched and communicated. 
Whatever their approach, all historians study past human cultures via sources: they seek 
to make sense of such sources in a variety of contexts, and they share many fundamental 
tools of research, interpretation and communication. Despite these underlying 
similarities, history remains a difficult subject to define. Indeed, as Jordanova argues, 
history remains “inherently an eclectic discipline and the skills it requires are 
correspondingly diverse” (Jordanova, 2006, p. 171). But eclecticism is not meant as a 
dirty word here: it means a fruitful pragmatic strategy rather than messiness. To cope 
with the complexities of the past, historians need to avoid thinking too rigidly and be 
prepared to deploy a range of analytical and interpretative techniques. 
In this paper I will be examining the ways that eclecticism in history and in particular 
my own field, the history of science, has been, and can continue to be, enormously 
beneficial to our understanding of the places of psychical research in past cultures. 
Although the examples on which I draw are taken predominantly from my present 
research on late-Victorian physical and psychical researches, they serve to illustrate a 
range of more general analytical approaches and historical questions that I believe are 
entirely appropriate for other time periods and places. It will become clear that the uses to 
which I put history differ from the uses that psychical researchers and parapsychologists 
have made of it or envision for it (see, for example, Alvarado, 1982): what primarily 
interests me is what historical sources in psychical research tell us about past possibilities 
in the sciences and cultures rather than the way that they can be used to support theories 
and research directions in current psychical research. Both types of history have their 
place in today’s academic world and it is hoped that this paper will form part of an 
ongoing and fruitful dialogue between historians and psychical researchers. 
The following section traces the uses to which history has been put by practitioners 
and critics of psychical research and related enterprises since the mid-nineteenth century. 
Different histories, we shall see, have been constructed to serve radically different 
agendas from legitimating to vanquishing psychical research. The paper then outlines the 
changes in the historiography of the sciences over the past two centuries, and explores the 
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reasons why the most recent developments in the history of science and in other branches 
of history, have proved particularly effective in bringing psychical and ‘occult’ sciences 
from the margins of historical analysis. The balance of the paper argues that historical 
approaches informed by recent anthropological, sociological, and geographical studies of 
the sciences can prove immensely productive in challenging the sterile analytical 
framework in which psychical research is assumed to be a ‘pseudo-science’ and rigidly 
demarcated from ‘orthodox’ or ‘mainstream’ sciences. These approaches help us tease 
out fundamental similarities between psychical research and many of the ‘orthodox’ 
scientific enterprises in which Victorian pioneers of psychical research were actively 
involved — including the crucial role of values, interests and ‘non-scientific’ factors in 
knowledge-making, and the problems of replication, visibility, environment, and trust in 
experimental research. In conclusion, I suggest that future histories of psychical research 
need to attend to the details of the ‘orthodox’ science practised by its pioneers, warts and 
all, because these will help us understand the important place that psychical research 
could occupy in past scientific cultures. 
  
PSYCHICAL RESEARCHERS AS HISTORIANS 
The term ‘histories’ rather than ‘history’ has always been appropriate for psychical 
research and the so-called ‘occult sciences’ on which its founders drew. Those Victorians 
who preoccupied themselves with psychic phenomena, including spiritualists, psychical 
researchers, psychiatrists, clergymen, and stage magicians, agreed that historical sources 
were important but used them to support radically different views on the reality, nature 
and provenance of the phenomena. Take, for example, the British spiritualist William 
Howitt, whose mammoth History of the Supernatural regarded the “mass of evidence 
from every age and people”, from ancient miracles to “Modern Spiritualism”, as proving 
the reality of “spiritual agencies” which he relished as much-needed weapons in the fight 
against religious infidelity (Howitt, 1863, vol. 1, p. iv). No such lessons were drawn by 
Frank Podmore in his equally voluminous Modern Spiritualism: A History and a 
Criticism. This turned history against the spiritualists, concluding that “spiritual influence 
or occult force” was largely based on “discredited physical phenomena”, legerdemain, 
and obscure powers of the mind (Podmore, 1902, vol. 2, p. 354). But Podmore’s 
concluding warning that “contemptuous rejection” of all evidence of psychic phenomena 
was as dangerous as credulous acceptance contrasted with the far harsher verdict of 
Ernest Hart who, like many late-Victorian medical practitioners made the history of the 
occult from Medieval witches and wizards to modern-day spiritualists and thought-
readers a woeful story of “follies and deceptions” (Hart, 1892, p. 36). Examples of these 
different uses of history can be found in more recent literature: compare, for example, the 
very different verdicts of the pro-spiritualist Bassett (1990), the hyper-sceptical Stenger 
(1990) and the considerably more balanced Beloff (1993), which assess the extent to 
which past and more recent cases of psychic phenomena were genuine. 
As with any architects of troubled scientific enterprises, early psychical researchers 
turned to history as a legitimating strategy (Jardine, 1991, pp. 121–145). The invention of 
founding fathers and noble genealogies was an important but often controversial 
procedure, as the case of Michael Faraday strikingly illustrates. As one of the leading 
natural philosophers of the nineteenth century, Faraday was a powerful authority to 
invoke in support of a range of scientific, religious and intellectual views (see, for 
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example, Cantor, 1996). This meant that, especially after his death in 1867, different 
Victorians invented different Faradays to suit their particular purposes. When, in 1871, 
the British chemist William Crookes published evidence of a capricious “psychic force” 
(Crookes, 1871a), he was immediately attacked by the veteran physiologist William 
Benjamin Carpenter for being a poor experimentalist and a bad historian. Carpenter 
charged that Crookes was “entirely ignorant of the previous history of the subject, and 
had not even acquainted himself with the mode in which Professor Faraday had 
demonstrated the real nature of Table-turning” (Carpenter, 1871, p. 308). As Winter 
(1998, pp. 269–305) explains, Faraday was in many quarters a potent name to invoke 
against spiritualism primarily owing to his 1853 demonstration that the motive force of 
table-turning arose from the unconscious muscular action of the table-turners themselves, 
not from disembodied spirits (Faraday, 1853). Had Crookes been a better historian, 
Carpenter implied, and had he familiarised himself with Faraday’s and his own work on 
spiritualism and mesmerism, then he would have understood how to devise better tests of 
the alleged forces exerted by mediums and been better protected against self-deception, 
mediumistic trickery and the other dangers in this area of research. 
Crookes vehemently denied historical ignorance. He boasted that as a youth he had 
discussed with Faraday himself the very machine that the illustrious savant had 
constructed to indicate the subtle forces exerted by table-turners. Crookes’s claim that he 
knew Faraday better than his critic was meant to give extra force to his different view of 
Faraday’s significance to the history of spiritualism. What mattered was that Faraday 
judged table-turning and later manifestations of spiritualism worthy of investigation at 
all, not that he consequently considered them scientifically unpromising. Introducing his 
second published paper on experiments on D. D. Home’s “psychic force”, he insisted: 
“That [spiritualism] is a legitimate subject for scientific inquiry scarcely needs assertion. 
Faraday himself did not consider it beneath his dignity to examine similar phenomena” 
and if “circumstances had not prevented Faraday from meeting Mr. Home, I have no 
doubt he would have witnessed phenomena similar to those I am about to describe” 
(Crookes, 1871b, p. 475). Crookes’s campaign to turn history against Carpenter 
continued by subtler means. He subsequently (Crookes, 1877) commissioned the 
naturalist and spiritualist Alfred Russel Wallace to review for his own widely-circulated 
periodical, the Quarterly Journal of Science, of Carpenter’s (1877) Mesmerism, 
Spiritualism, &c, Historically and Scientifically Considered, which was largely a restatement 
of the arguments that the physiologist had been levelling against the theories and 
explanations of mesmerists and spiritualists. What the naturalist and spiritualist found 
particularly objectionable was that Carpenter’s book had omitted a litany of historical 
details which put “disputed theories” and “new truths” in a much more favourable light. 
In concluding his long and blistering tirade, Wallace implied that Carpenter had breached 
the code of “literary morality” and had “put forth, under the guise of impartial history, a 
one-sided and erroneous account of a disputed question” (Wallace, 1877, p. 414). 
Despite Crookes’s efforts Faraday remained a difficult choice of icon for psychical 
researchers. Crookes’s fellow physicist-psychical researcher Oliver Lodge thought that 
while Faraday’s writings showed the “spirit which gave birth to the S.P.R.” (Lodge, 
1906, p. 466) his judgement went “slightly astray” on the question of spiritualism, and it 
was to much older and less obviously ‘scientific’ savants that he turned for appropriate 
ancestors of psychical research. His favourite candidate was the sixteenth century English 
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statesman and philosopher Francis Bacon. For Lodge the spirit of hostility towards late-
Victorian psychical research was no different from that which thwarted “science” three 
hundred years earlier and it took figures such as Bacon to vanquish the idea that science 
was “an unholy prying into the secrets of Nature” (Lodge, 1903a, p. 4). Lodge’s latter-
day Bacon was his close friend and colleague F. W. H. Myers. In a somewhat incestuous 
review in the journal Nature of Myers’s posthumous Human Personality and its Survival 
of Bodily Death (1903), he sought to reassure an audience traditionally circumspect about 
psychical research that “[m]en not professionally scientific have had a profound influence 
on scientific progress before now” (Lodge, 1903b, p. 145) and had no doubt that Myers’s 
book would have the same effect on the development of the psychical sciences as Novum 
Organum — the second and most important part of Bacon’s major treatise on scientific 
methodology (Bacon, 1620) — had produced on the physical sciences. If Lodge thought 
Myers a latter-day Bacon, then William Fletcher Barrett thought the SPR was a latter-day 
early Royal Society. Despairing what he perceived to be the scientific establishment’s 
continuing opposition to psychical research, Barrett insisted that several early Fellows of 
that leading scientific organisation, such as Robert Boyle and Joseph Glanvill, were “true 
psychical researchers” because they did not hesitate to consider the dowsing-rod, 
demons, and poltergeists fit topics of scientific enquiry (Barrett, 1924, p. 277). 
 
HISTORIES OF THE SCIENCES AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH 
Lodge’s and Barrett’s histories are significant not only as examples of the way 
histories were used to raise the status of troubled sciences but as challenges to the then 
dominant historiography of the sciences. In emphasising the ‘occult’ forays of founding 
fathers of the sciences they, along with several other early twentieth century scientists, 
were challenging a progressivist view of the history of the sciences which, as Golinski 
(1998), Bowler and Morus (2005) and others have reminded us, had been widely-
accepted since the late eighteenth century and which would prevail among most 
historians of science until the 1960s. 
When, in the late eighteenth century Enlightenment, the earliest systematic histories of 
the sciences were penned, the sciences were widely regarded as sources of objective and 
value-free knowledge of the natural world and the basis of intellectual, technological, 
social, moral, and cultural progress. For the scientific practitioners who were chiefly 
responsible for such histories, the sciences of the present could be legitimated by appeal 
to a certain vision of the history of science which, unlike histories of politics, showed 
clearly the triumph of human reason over superstition, priestly dogmatism, and other 
supposed hindrances to progress. Enlightenment histories of progress partly informed 
what the twentieth century historian Herbert Butterfield (1973) pejoratively termed the 
‘Whig’ approaches of Thomas Babington Macaulay and other Victorian historians in 
which the past was judged in terms of the present and British history was seen as the 
story of the inevitable victory of the very liberal and Protestant values that the historians 
themselves sought to promulgate. 
Butterfield’s work illustrates that by the early twentieth century Whig and more 
generally present-centred approaches to that more traditional historical topic of politics 
were increasingly unpopular in academia, but the same approaches in histories of the 
sciences survived a good deal longer inside and outside academia, not least because of 
the persistence of the view that the sciences were inherently progressive and as 
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enterprises dealing with ‘objective nature’ their history had to be unlike those dealing 
with human societies. With rare exceptions, ‘occult’, ‘marginal’ or ‘heterodox’ sciences 
fared poorly in these narratives of scientific winners and losers: they were either 
concealed, marginalised or openly criticised because they were thought to be irrational, 
foolish, and altogether irrelevant to the progress of science (see, for example, Merz, 
1896–1914, Sedgwick & Tyler, 1917). Typically, they were seen to have generated false 
knowledge because they were corrupted by values and interests — unlike true scientific 
knowledge, which was held to be objective and independent of social, economic, 
metaphysical and other ‘interests’. A rare exception is Dampier (1929) which, despite 
sharing the customary hostile attitude to alchemy, magic and other occult sciences, was 
not unsympathetic to the SPR, a society to which the author briefly belonged and whose 
“careful work” had in his opinion not yet produced “results of scientific value” (pp. 369–
70). 
While unsympathetic portrayals of ‘marginal’ sciences continue in popular scientific 
works and school science textbooks, they have been largely rejected by modern historians 
of science owing to dramatic changes in the historiography of the sciences in the last 
forty years. Historians of science continued using ‘Whig’ approaches until the 1960s 
when they began to assimilate the insights of the American historian and philosopher of 
science Thomas Kuhn (1962) and other radical philosophical works which offered the 
most potent challenge to the idea that science was a steady ascent to the objective truth 
about the natural world. For Kuhn, the history of science could be divided into a 
succession of distinct and discontinuous “paradigms” — the theories, techniques, and 
puzzles considered acceptable in science in a given period — and that objective 
comparisons between paradigms were impossible. Crucially, Kuhn argued that what was 
true and rational in one paradigm was false and irrational in another. One of the most 
important interpretations of Kuhn’s work was made by a group of Edinburgh-based 
sociologists of science who in the 1970s explored the construction of scientific 
knowledge irrespective of whether they were true or false and explained such knowledge 
in terms of the same human interests and values that informed any other form of 
knowledge (Barnes, 1974; Bloor, 1976). The controversial insistence of this ‘Edinburgh 
School’ of scholars, that scientific knowledge was socially determined and therefore 
subject to sociological analysis, built partly on Marxist views of science, and echoed the 
claims of much postmodern philosophy and history, but it infuriated most scientists who 
maintained that their enterprises were epistemologically privileged and resulted in 
disinterested objective knowledge. Although historians of science criticised the models of 
scientific activity proposed by Kuhn and his interpreters, they recognised the profound 
historiographical implications of this work (Barnes & Shapin, 1979; Golinski, 1998; 
Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). Science had to be seen as a social activity and past scientific 
models and theories had to be understood in their historical contexts, irrespective of 
whether they subsequently proved to be erroneous. Historians of science have since 
become highly sensitive to the strangeness of past scientific cultures and seek to 
understand, for example, why in the late seventeenth century it was possible for natural 
philosophy to be entangled with alchemy, Biblical scholarship and mysticism, or why in 
the early and mid-nineteenth century phrenology and mesmerism were possible sciences 
of the mind and body. 
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Of all post-war developments in the historiography of the sciences, none proved more 
sympathetic towards the occult than revisionist studies of early modern natural 
philosophy. Debus (1965), Dobbs (1975), Yates (1964) and other works showed the debt 
of the empirical and analytical methods developed by iconic figures of the ‘Scientific 
Revolution’ to the Renaissance revival of ancient texts on Hermeticism, alchemy, and 
natural magic. As Mauskopf (1990) argued, this “rehabilitative” goal was later extended 
to later manifestations of ‘marginal’ sciences including studies showing the 
entanglements of eighteenth century electrical practices and animal magnetism, Romantic 
era sciences and Naturphilosophie, and of early nineteenth century psychology and 
phrenology. Making a place for psychical research in late nineteenth and twentieth 
century sciences has proved more difficult partly because of a lingering suspicion that 
‘modern’ forms of occultism were either irrelevant to ‘modern’ scientific enterprises or 
was difficult to regard as a serious scientific pursuit. Unsurprisingly, in the 1960s, ‘70s 
and ‘80s, the most innovative approaches to the history of psychical research came not 
from historians of the sciences, but from intellectual, cultural and social historians, and 
psychical researchers themselves. Barrow (1986), Braude (1989), Cerullo (1982), Gauld 
(1968), Moore (1977), Oppenheim (1985), Owen (1989), and Turner (1974) took 
refreshingly historicist approaches, largely eschewing the question of whether particular 
views were ultimately justified and which linked the rise of interest in spiritualism and 
the invention of psychical research to broader themes and concerns long recognised by 
historians, from religious doubt, political radicalism and abolitionism, to Darwinism, 
feminism and imperialism. Since the 1990s the entanglements of psychical and occult 
sciences with other aspects of past cultures has been further explored with revisionist 
studies of modern esotericism (see Faivre, 1994; Faivre & Needleman, 1992; Godwin 
1994), and with works by cultural and literary historians such as Harvey (2007), 
Luckhurst (2002), Owen (2004), Royle (1990), Thurschwell (2001), Treitel (2004), and 
Warner (2006), which make it very difficult to interpret the diverse facets of modernism 
without recognising their engagement with the very questions of self and other that are 
raised so acutely by psychical research. These analyses have made it possible for 
spiritualism, mesmerism, Theosophy, and psychical research to enter what might be 
called ‘mainstream’ studies of the history and literature of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. A welcome sign of our intellectual times is that Hoppen (1998), one of the 
volumes of the New Oxford History of England, devotes an entire page to these subjects 
— something that would have been difficult, if not impossible, in the standard history 
textbooks of a few decades ago. 
Given the strides that historians of early modern natural philosophy have made 
towards rehabilitating occult practices, it is not surprising that two scholars with expertise 
in this area should have produced one of the most significant moves forward in the 
historiography of modern psychic sciences. Mauskopf and McVaugh (1980) was more 
than just another history of early and mid-twentieth century parapsychology, but a 
rewarding attempt to understand parapsychology in the revisionist way that historians of 
science were then beginning to analyse other scientific disciplines. They examined 
parapsychology as one of the “social, institutional, and cultural” forms of science rather 
than “merely ‘science’ as an abstract set of theories and techniques” (p. xi). Significantly, 
the authors took the “subject matter and conclusions seriously” and did not allow the 
“elusive” status of parapsychology to affect their analysis (p. xiii): unlike so many 
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teleological accounts of parapsychology, they do not assume that the science was 
destined from the start to remain marginal and problematic. Indeed, they tried and, in my 
view, largely succeeded in treating parapsychology like “any speciality beginning to 
develop out of a natural scientific background” which meant exploring the role of such 
factors as institutional structures, training, funding, and audiences in the building of new 
sciences (p. xiv). 
 
A NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH 
Mauskopf and McVaugh (1980) is the first of many steps that I believe needs to be 
taken towards a more contextualist history of the origins and development of psychical 
research. This approach needs to look much closer at how this new science developed out 
of a “natural-scientific background” and thus will complement the range of excellent 
historical studies of the religious, political and social contexts that made psychical 
research desirable and possible (Cerullo, 1982; Gauld, 1968; Moore, 1977; and Turner, 
1974). I want to suggest that it should avoid the assumption that the natural sciences can 
be regarded as unproblematic background to psychical research. Many of the natural 
scientific enterprises in which leading psychical researchers cultivated their experimental, 
conceptual, and rhetorical skills did indeed prove highly successful, but during the early 
phases of such enterprises — the very periods in which psychical researchers pursued 
them — they were often difficult to prosecute and shrouded in controversy. A properly 
contextual analysis will be sensitive to the nuances of working in the sciences, warts and 
all, because when navigating the troubled waters of psychical research scientific 
practitioners often drew on experiences of the exciting possibilities and intractable 
puzzles, the successful and failed experiments, the skilled and incompetent practitioners, 
the powerful and temperamental instruments, and the agreements and controversies. 
The proposition that psychical research developed out of a “natural scientific 
background” carries with it the misleading implication that the natural sciences remained 
in the background of psychical research. But during some of their most intense periods of 
psychic investigation, many scientific practitioners had their natural scientific researches 
very much in the foreground. In some cases psychical and natural researches overlapped 
temporally and spatially: consider Crookes’s domestic laboratories in the 1870s that saw 
simultaneous attempts to investigate and interrelate the repulsive effect of radiation on 
bodies in vacuo, D. D. Home’s abilities to exert forces at a distance, and Karl von 
Reichenbach’s ‘od’ force (Crookes, 1871a; 1871b; 1875; Noakes, 2002); or take the 
hospital ward at Le Havre where, in the late 1880s, the French professor of philosophy 
Pierre Janet hypnotised hysterical patients at a distance and studied automatism and used 
both researches in the formulation of his revolutionary concepts of psychological 
automatisms, subconscious behaviour and split personality (Janet, 1889); or take the 
physical laboratory of University College Liverpool in the mid-1890s, in which Oliver 
Lodge and his technician Benjamin Davies explored the mechanical forces that appeared 
to be causing telekinetic phenomena and which might be exerted by rapidly moving 
matter on the ether of space (Davies, 1916; Lodge, 1893a). These are only the more 
striking of many cases that prompt us to question the rigid boundaries that so many 
historians have drawn between psychical and other sciences, and which challenge the 
crass view that scientists were ‘scientific’ when pursuing physical research and ‘pseudo-
scientific’ or ‘non-scientific’ when conducting psychical research. 
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Recent studies of nineteenth century sciences have made it particularly difficult to 
sustain these distinctions. The puzzles of abnormal psychology and human evolution and 
the possibilities of the physics of electricity, energy, matter and ether gave value to the 
evidence for psychic phenomena. Crabtree (1993), Ellenberger (1970), Gauld (1992), and 
Winter (1998) emphasise the debt of psychiatry and psychoanalysis to nineteenth century 
studies of animal magnetism, mesmerism and hypnotism; Kottler (1974), Turner (1974) 
and Fichman (2004) explain that it was the difficulty of explaining human morality in 
terms of the natural selection mechanism of biological evolution that prompted Alfred 
Russel Wallace to suppose that human evolution had been guided by the kinds of spiritual 
agencies manifested in séances; and Noakes (2005, 2008), and Wilson (1971) show that it 
was partly the ability of physicists successfully to measure and manipulate the electrical 
fluid, the invisible ether of space and the microscopic constituents of matter that made 
some of them confident that they could devise plausible physical theories of telepathy 
and powerful physical tests of materialisations. These studies suggest not only specific 
connections between natural and psychical researches but illustrate the more general need 
to be sensitive to the complexity, strangeness, and in many instances, the controversial 
nature of ‘orthodox’ sciences that are so often contrasted with the ‘heterodox’ and 
troubled science of psychical research. This need to problematise forms of past scientific 
activity previously taken to be straightforward further helps us move away from Whig 
and more generally present-centred historiography and owes much to anthropological and 
sociological studies of the sciences made since the 1970s. If, as Jordanova (2006) argues, 
history is strengthened by a pragmatic use of an eclectic range of interpretative resources, 
then one of the most eclectic of all sub-branches of history, the history of science, is 
arguably one of the strongest precisely because it has drawn so liberally on neighbouring 
disciplines to devise fruitful new ways of looking at the pasts of the sciences. 
The historiographical developments made possible by this interdisciplinary cross-
fertilisation have arisen from three important claims arising from science and technology 
studies, which suggest searching questions that we can ask when confronting primary 
historical materials relating to the sciences (Golinski, 1998; Jasanoff, Markle, Petersen & 
Pinch, 1994). First, it is more accurate to speak of the sciences (plural) than science 
(singular) because this better captures the fact that the supposedly homogeneous and 
monolithic thing called ‘science’ comprises a range of very different enterprises from 
ornithology and experimental psychology to spectroscopy and pathology, each with its 
heterogeneous array of personnel, skills, publications, training programmes, theories, 
concepts, workplaces, and material artefacts. An examination of the map of the sciences 
for a given period shows that some sciences were more secure than others (contrast 
celestial mechanics and experimental psychology in the mid-nineteenth century) and that 
occult and psychical sciences were certainly not alone in being seen as ‘marginal’. 
Comparing maps of the sciences from different periods also highlights the changing 
intellectual position of sciences: some (such as natural theology and spiritualism) were 
considered in the early and mid-nineteenth century be linked to more established sciences 
(astronomy and psychology) but have now largely moved off the map of the sciences; 
other enterprises have disappeared into other sciences (for example mesmerism was 
reinvented as part of psychoanalysis and psychiatry); and some emerged as disciplines in 
their own right (e.g. spectro-chemical analysis of starlight became the cornerstone of 
astrophysics). 
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This geographical-chronological analysis makes it very difficult to speak of a single 
unchanging scientific enterprise against which to define and lambast psychical research, 
spiritualism and mesmerism. It forces us to reject such terms such as ‘pseudo-science’ 
and ‘marginal science’ as obvious or inherent descriptors of psychical research and to 
develop a more critical historical perspective: a major task faced by the historian, I want 
to suggest, is not to understand why anyone ever took psychical research and ancestral 
enterprises seriously, but to understand how and why it came to be demarcated from 
other scientific practices as ‘pseudo-scientific’. As an emergent attribute, ‘pseudo-
science’ cannot also provide the explanation of why, for example, mesmerism and 
spiritualism, suffered the fates that they did and below we shall see that this demarcation 
process depended more on social, cultural, political and other ‘non-scientific’ factors as 
scientific factors (Bauer, 2001; Cooter, 1980, 1984; Gieryn, 1999; Hess, 1993; Mauskopf, 
1990).  
The second historiographical lesson from sociology and anthropology is to treat 
consensus and agreement, rather than dissent and disagreement, as the explanandum. 
Scientists are not naturally less inclined to disagree than other human beings and 
therefore it is legitimate to understand how they come to agree with each other about the 
natural world. One important consequence of this model of scientific work is that it 
forces us to reconsider the claim that psychical research is deviant because it does not 
enjoy much consensus over facts or methods. Many of the disagreements that have 
dogged psychical research are common to all sciences and what historians need to do is 
to understand why it has not commanded the consensus enjoyed by other sciences. As 
sociologists of science showed from the 1970s, past and present controversies in the 
sciences furnish key insights into the workings of the sciences that are otherwise hidden 
from view. More than at any other time, controversies reveal the inherently social 
character of doing science and making scientific knowledge. For example, analysis in 
Collins (1985) of such cases as late-twentieth century gravity wave detectors and in 
Collins and Pinch (1982) of Uri Geller’s paranormal metal bending reveals that rival 
experimenters disagree on what counts as the ‘right result’ and the best experiment. 
Neither ‘objective reality’ nor ‘experts’ can be invoked to close the matter because both 
factors are in dispute. To close controversies and persuade others of the credibility of 
their version of ‘objective reality’, scientists have necessarily to mobilise more than just 
measurements, instruments, and theories, but the literary, financial, institutional, political 
and other ‘non-scientific’ aspects of their culture. As David Gooding succinctly puts it, 
scientists’ abilities to explain and control nature “depends as much on their mastery of 
culture as upon their study of nature” (Gooding, 1985, p. 37). 
There are manifold reasons why this lesson matters to historical analysis of psychical 
research. It prompts us to question the extent to which scientific views commanded the 
assent that historians have supposed. It has been a persistent oversight of historians to 
speak of a coherent Victorian scientific worldview to which psychical research was a 
reaction and which makes psychical research looks especially retrograde. But was there a 
consensus on this worldview? Did all nineteenth century scientists subscribe to the view, 
widely ascribed to T. H. Huxley, John Tyndall and other ‘scientific naturalists’ that the 
entire physical cosmos, including life and mind, could be reduced to the laws of matter 
and motion? As Barton (1985), Desmond (1994), Lightman (1987), Smith (1990) and 
Wilson (1987) explain, this mechanistic, materialistic, and deterministic cosmology does 
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not accurately characterise the views of the ‘scientific naturalists’ and was widely 
attacked by many of the most distinguished figures in Victorian science. Much as they 
despised ‘borderland’ topics such as spiritualism, physicists such as William Thomson 
(Lord Kelvin), James Clerk Maxwell, George Gabriel Stokes, and Peter Guthrie Tait 
were far more exasperated by, and spoke out more frequently against, those who sought 
to rid the cosmos of Divine agency and spiritual meaning. For Tait the “pernicious 
nonsense” of materialism was far more dangerous than the “harmless folly” of 
spiritualism because it threatened the moral and social fabric of Victorian Britain (Tait, 
1876, p. 25). Indeed, it is partly because they shared hostility to the perceived greater 
threat of materialism that the relationship between Tait and Balfour Stewart, the Third 
Baron Rayleigh and Kelvin, and Crookes and Stokes, remained close and cordial despite 
differences over spiritualism. 
By appreciating the once controversial character of natural scientific and technological 
enterprises we are in a much better position to understand the rhetoric developed by 
scientific practitioners to persuade colleagues that they could be trusted to speak reliably 
about psychic phenomena. When, in August 1871, the Scottish anatomist Allen Thomson 
launched a scathing public attack on scientific supporters of spiritualism, the prominent 
electrical engineer and spiritualist Cromwell Varley (1871) expressed incredulity that 
scientific practitioners could readily accept his own researches on the “unusual 
phenomena” of globular lightning and Crookes’s work on the spectroscopic detection of 
the new chemical element thallium and yet distrust them when it came to “phenomena 
not more startling” than spectra or lightning but called psychic. As far as Varley was 
concerned, there were plenty of phenomena in physics and electrical engineering which 
could be doubted for the same reasons that the existence of psychic phenomena was 
questioned. Ball lightning and other forms of electrical discharge, chemical spectra, and 
the intelligence sent through transatlantic cables were capricious, frequently hard to 
detect, and often difficult to distinguish from subjective impressions, spurious signals and 
other interferences; and yet Varley, Crookes, Lodge and other physicists involved in 
psychical research enjoyed considerable scientific status because of their abilities to 
successfully detect and manipulate such phenomena and in general to distinguish fact 
from fancy in these areas of physical research. It was precisely because submarine 
telegraphy had in its early years been dogged by a welter of technical problems and 
public scepticism, and because he had subsequently helped turn it into a electrical 
communications system on which people could rely, that Varley believed his “proofs” of 
the controversial system of spiritual telegraphy could also be trusted. 
Crookes and the Fourth Baron Rayleigh (Robert John Strutt) made similar appeals to 
the past and present uncertainties of physics when weighing into twentieth century 
disputes over psychic phenomena. Early in the 1900s Crookes (1909) responded in 
private to a recent attack on the achievements of psychical research written by the veteran 
astronomer and former president of the American SPR Simon Newcomb. Crookes 
objected to Newcomb’s implied argument that since phantasms and other psychic 
phenomena had been witnessed by only a few observers then such phenomena were more 
likely to be due to known causes such as hallucination. For Crookes, this argument also 
threatened one of the most successful new sciences of the nineteenth century: 
spectroscopy. “There are some people so constituted that nothing psychic will take place 
in their presence”, he explained, “Prof. Sidgwick was one. In spite of repeated trials he 
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never witnessed anything. I myself have often tried to see beyond the [very faint] H line 
in the solar spectrum, but have failed. Am I to say that others with sharper eyes who say 
they can see beyond that line are suffering under an hallucination?” Crookes’s argument 
makes most sense when seen in the context of the troubled early history of spectroscopy. 
As one of the most energetic of the Victorian practitioners of the technique, Crookes 
sparked and witnessed numerous controversies over the existence and interpretation of 
the lines seen when analysing the light of terrestrial and celestial bodies (see, for 
example, James, 1988), and was acutely aware of the past and continuing epistemological 
problems posed by this now-successful tool of chemical discovery. Just as astronomers 
such as Newcomb had learned to place trust in trained observers who could see spectral 
lines invisible to others, so, Crookes insisted, he also had to trust those respectable 
persons who testified in the SPR’s publications to psychic phenomena unseen by most 
people. The lack of objectivity of some phenomena in physics was one reason why, some 
twenty-two years later, Rayleigh (1932) took exception to a criticism of psychical 
research methods. Discussing his investigations of Rudi Schneider with Theodore 
Besterman, he challenged Besterman’s view that “none but objective records could really 
establish anything, either in psychical matters or in physical research generally” on the 
grounds that there were at least two phenomena in physics — light and cathode rays — 
that were “believed in and established” long before they could be photographed or made 
to actuate a self-recording instrument. Again, Rayleigh’s argument makes particular 
sense when we consider that he, like Crookes and Lodge, spent much of the late-
nineteenth and early twentieth century grappling with the experimental problems of 
producing and interpreting cathode rays and other phenomena of electrical discharge. 
The focus on explaining consensus, and on scientific knowledge as a social 
achievement, also helps us move away from the jaundiced view that psychical research 
was a troubled enterprise because its claims to knowledge were tarnished by ‘interests’ 
and ‘values’. Closer historical analysis of primary sources shows how much interests and 
values mattered in other sciences, including those considered firmly ‘orthodox’ and 
‘hard’. Studies such as Hunt (1997), Schaffer (1992) and Smith (1998) demonstrate that 
we cannot understand why those monuments of classical physics — thermodynamics and 
electromagnetic field theory — developed in the way they did in Britain without 
considering the wider historical contexts of industrialisation, imperial politics, and 
Presbyterian religion. Field theory developed faster in Britain than elsewhere because its 
empire was held together with submarine telegraphs whose efficient working depended 
on reliable theories of electrical energy flow; models of heat dissipation seemed more 
plausible and valuable to their architects because they were consistent with certain 
theologies of nature and helped raise the economic productivity of Britain’s steam-
powered industries. On this basis, psychical research no longer looks like a special case 
of a ‘bad science’ corrupted by non-scientific values. Rather, psychical research looks 
more like physics and indeed, many other established nineteenth-century sciences whose 
protagonists recognised and articulated the religious and social interpretations of their 
enterprises. It is no surprise that the Victorian worlds of thermodynamics and 
electromagnetic field theory should have produced physicists such as Balfour Stewart and 
Oliver Lodge, who saw psychical research as a more obvious way of using experimental 
research to buttress religious, political and other non-scientific values. 
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Sociological and anthropological analysis of controversies also helps considerably in 
addressing the question of why psychical research has remained an ‘elusive science’. The 
answer certainly cannot be that it’s because psychic phenomena do not exist or because 
experiments have been done so badly, because what counts as the ‘right result’ and ‘good 
experiment’ has been and still is in question. We have to explore other, ‘non-scientific’ 
factors as well. The difficulty that the likes of Barrett, Crookes and Lodge faced in 
persuading scientific colleagues that their psychical investigations were credible arose 
less from obvious ‘scientific’ reasons such as decisive counter-experiments as from 
decisions based on cultural, political, moral, and religious factors. Stokes, for instance, 
refused to participate in a scientific committee to investigate Crookes’s psychic force 
researches simply because he had “heard too much of the tricks of Spiritualists” (Stokes, 
1871, p. 482), while his fervent evangelical Anglicanism informed his dislike of Barrett’s 
“speculations about the state of disembodied spirits” and proposition that the “natural 
faculties” could be used to answer questions about the afterlife (Stokes, 1880). Equally 
‘unscientific’ were Kelvin, whose hostility to “borderland” researches stemmed not from 
first-hand experience but from the assumption that “nearly everything in hypnotism and 
clairvoyance is imposture and the rest bad observation” (Thomson, 1893, p. 17), and the 
physicist George Carey Foster, whose dim view of his former student Lodge’s claims 
about physical manifestations in séances was based on his firm belief that the “whole 
progress of physics” — something to which he had devoted his entire career — was 
“based on the assumption that these things do not happen” (Foster, 1894). 
The final historiographical lesson from the sociology and anthropology of sciences 
returns us to the theme of geography. Historians of science are now increasingly 
interested in the spatial as well as the temporal characteristics of the sciences 
(Livingstone, 2003; Naylor, 2005). They are no longer just interested in when discoveries 
were made and how sciences developed in time, but the significance of the physical and 
intellectual spaces where scientific knowledge is made, displayed and utilised, and why 
scientific claims made in one location came to be accepted elsewhere and regarded as 
true everywhere. Naturally, this approach draws attention to the role of replication, 
particularly whether the replication of one experiment takes place elsewhere and when it 
does, what counts as a replication, and how this becomes constitutive of scientific 
knowledge. Spatial questions are particularly appropriate in the history of psychical 
research because a frequent criticism of the science has been that its experimental results 
are difficult to reproduce outside the principal sites of psychical enquiry. The problem 
was well expressed by the editor of the English Mechanic who, in 1872, attacked 
spiritualists for not preferring “a free and unfavoured platform for the exhibition of 
spiritualistic phenomena” (“Remarks”, 1872, p. 455). As far as he was concerned the 
truth in the matter could not depend on “drawn curtains and darkened rooms” and was 
not “temporary and evanescent like a will-o’-the-wisp, but bright and enduring as the 
sun”. It was to avoid this suspicious dependency of psychic ‘facts’ on particular types of 
space that Crookes was so keen in late 1869 to show “experimentally” the results of the 
spiritualistic investigations he had made during domestic séances in the premier Victorian 
site of public scientific display: the Royal Institution of Great Britain (Medhurst, Goldney 
& Barrington, 1972, pp. 233–234).  
One of the reasons why many nineteenth century scientists tolerated the spatial 
contingencies of spiritualistic phenomena was because they had encountered similar 
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problems in their natural scientific researches. Many of the controversies in which they 
were involved (for instance, those over the radiometer, electrical discharge, and spectro-
chemical analysis) arose from the fact that effects or results that they had produced within 
one location proved difficult to reproduce elsewhere by other practitioners. A 
considerable number of the researches on which they devoted their energies involved 
delicate instruments that were highly sensitive to changes in environmental conditions 
and which needed careful handling. It was to this often taxing aspect of the experimental 
life that Barrett (1894, p. 585) appealed when he defended the suspiciously dark 
conditions of spiritualist séances: 
We should get no results if our photographic plates were exposed to the light of the 
room simultaneously with the luminous image formed by the lens. In every physical 
process we have to guard against disturbing causes. If, for example, Professor S. P. 
Langley, of Washington, in the delicate experiments he is now conducting — exploring the 
ultra red radiation of the sun — had allowed the thermal radiation of himself or his 
assistants to fall on his sensitive thermoscope, his results would have been confused and 
unintelligible. We know that similar confused results are obtained in psychical research, 
especially by those who fancy the sole function of a scientific investigator is to the play the 
part of a scientific detective.  
The ability of scientists to successfully to overcome problems of physical and 
intellectual geography in their natural scientific work made them supremely confident in 
making forays into psychical research. Varley’s famous use of electrical apparatus to test 
whether the medium Florence Cook masqueraded as her materialised spirit form ‘Katie 
King’ owed much to the fact that he had successfully used the same apparatus in a variety 
of locations to gauge the integrity of submarine telegraph cables (Noakes, 1999). Lodge’s 
boasts of the early 1890s that physicists had the authority to lead investigations into that 
“borderland of physics and psychology” (Lodge, 1892, p. 553), psychical research, and 
that an ether-based physics, rather than a purely mechanical one, would enable physicists 
to “annex vital or mental processes” (Lodge, 1893b, p. 862), including psychic 
phenomena, has to be seen in the context of his and other Victorian physicists’ 
contemporary proclamation that they had, despite many struggles, developed an ethereal 
theory of electricity which they believed enabled fields inside and outside of physics to 
be “annexed to Electricity, which has thus become an imperial science” (Lodge, 1889, p. 
307). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In concluding his Myers Memorial lecture in 1930 Oliver Lodge explained that one of 
the difficulties of psychical research was assessing the extent to which information given 
by professed spirits of the dead was trustworthy. The problems of interpreting the 
messages of ‘controls’ seemed to be similar to the problems of wireless telegraphy and 
history. Messages needed to be read if they were made by a traveller in an exotic new 
land whose only means of communication was via a telegraph whose receiving 
instrument, the automatist, “may have a difficulty in understanding and transmitting, and 
who sometimes perhaps, like the scribes who reproduced ancient manuscripts, may insert 
glosses and interpretations of their own” (Lodge, 1930, p. 42). Judgement as to 
“authenticity and validity” was as important in evaluating the intelligence of “Higher 
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Powers” as it was in assessing the historical credibility of the Scriptures and the veracity 
of radio signals from the other side of the Atlantic. 
Lodge’s conclusion highlighted the virtues of eclecticism in psychical research and in 
that sense he echoed the views of Sidgwick which I quoted at the outset of this paper. Just 
as pioneering psychical researchers considered the most fruitful approach to their subject 
to be one involving the skills of the psychologist, psychiatrist, philologist, historian, 
physicist, stage magician, and detective, so I have suggested that the most fruitful 
historical analysis of psychical research must draw on the insights of a range of academic 
fields. Historians of science, who in my view have the most to contribute to histories of 
psychical research, have been and need to be especially eclectic. The skills they require to 
interpret scientific papers, notebooks, instruments, letters and other source materials 
depend on training in history and in the sciences — something which cuts across the 
supposed ‘two cultures’ divide (Snow, 1993). In many ways, the distinct training systems 
for historians and scientists has meant that scientists have tended to write histories that 
fail to meet the standards of professional historians, and that professional historians are 
usually poor scientists and, more worrying for the present discussion, have usually 
underestimated the importance of the sciences in their histories. Fortunately, however, the 
situation is changing and an increasing number of ‘mainstream’ historians are engaging 
with the work of historians of science, partly because such work teases out the intimate 
links between science and imperialism, race and other themes with which they have long 
been preoccupied. But the concession to familiar historical themes does not necessarily 
mean that historians need to compromise on their understanding of intellectual and 
scientific issues. The historian who does so risks facing the same kinds of criticism 
levelled at many ‘postmodern’ anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers of science 
during the so-called ‘science wars’ of the 1990s (see Labinger & Collins, 2001). Their 
argument that the sciences did not lead to objective knowledge sparked fierce reaction 
from professional scientists and many anti-relativist philosophers of science who accused 
their assailants of misunderstanding scientific theories and practices and of poor 
scholarship in general. Owing to the controversial nature of their subject, historians of 
psychical research need to be especially careful that they understand the scientific work 
of the figures on whom they work as well as make judicious use of the range of 
interpretative resources open to all historians. But attending to the details of past 
scientific cultures should not be done as an intervention in the ‘science wars’ but for the 
more constructive reason that it can genuinely help us move forward the debate on the 
past and present relationships between psychical research, other sciences, and general 
culture. This may well lead more historians to ask not why so many nineteenth century 
scientists got involved in psychical research, but given the nature of the sciences of the 
period why didn’t more do so? Frederic Myers once described the business of historians 
of science as producing long tales of “discovery and achievement” (Gurney, Myers & 
Podmore, 1886, p. xi). This paper has suggested that these tales need to be complex 
stories about human actors, and that this is precisely how we can better situate psychical 
research in our pasts. 
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